The economics of information goods suggest the need for institutional intervention to address the problem of revenue extraction from investments in resources characterized by high fixed costs of production and low marginal costs of reproduction and distribution. 
Introduction and Summary
Digital information resources, expressing ideas, such as creative works, education and scholarly materials, databases and software, are notoriously characterised by massive fixed costs of original production and low marginal costs of reproduction and distribution. As a consequence, the extraction of economic benefits from these goods is tricky and special institutional devices are needed to address the issue and encourage innovation. Awarding private ownership rights in order to allow commercial exploitation is a solution.
While intellectual property right institutions, such as copyright, contribute to the solution of the problem of appropriation of rents, they are marred by few vices such as the monopoly deadweight, as well as inefficiencies regarding cumulative innovation, standardisation and modular development (David, 2000) .
I argue that the digital age, in which those who arrange bits in certain order then own the arrangement 1 , calls for an extra vice to be added to the list accompanying copyright. This is the possibility of using copyright maliciously to subtract other people's works from the public domain. This practice is known as hijacking and when undertaken, the very rationale behind copyright protection is abused.
Having spotted this extra weakness, far from considering obsolete the institution of copyright and its justification, I maintain that a degree of flexibility in its design and application would be beneficial in cases in which the social risks of hijacking are unquestionable. Hijacking may show up in different forms, from direct appropriation of content or code, to creation of a proprietary complementary product built upon a public domain work, whose potential developments result in being constrained (e.g. a proprietary application designed for an open source programme).
Moreover, hijacking is not alone but has an accomplice in the plot to privatise scientific information and data that is the general regulatory trend towards extension of IPR protection 2 .
The second paragraph of this paper recalls briefly the peculiar economics of information goods, the problem of appropriation as well as the classical solutions applied to it. It is emphasised that nowadays, hijacking carried out by certain commercial firms may possibly add onto the list of vices marring the scheme of exclusive property rights granted, in order to foster creative productions.
The third paragraph deals with a particular case of actual hijaking that, even though does not generate noisy complaints, is representative of the risks associated with proprietary appropriation of a collective good. The discussed case is that of The Open Directory Project, a pure public good exploited by commercial search engines and directories which incorporate its data in information arrangements whose quality appear, given the market dynamics, more and more dubious.
The fourth paragraph discusses the emergence of new institutions, such as copyleft and think tank or "customisation agencies" (e.g. Creative Commons), capable of exorcising the problem.
Paragraph 5 concludes.
The Economic Nature of Digital Information Resources: Virtues and Risks of Appropriation Institutions
Information as a transferable flow of facts and details, communicating concepts or ideas,
constitutes an economic good that shows peculiar characteristics.
Information resources share with conventional public goods the properties of non-rivalry, non-excludability and high fixed costs of original production. Non-rivalry means that the amount of good available for consumption does not vary with the number of consumers drawing upon its stock. Non-excludability means that, given the low marginal cost of reproduction and distribution of a public good, it turns out to be tricky to charge a price for every taker. Massive fixed costs of original production imply the unsustainability of a competitive market for this kind of goods.
Apart from these features, information is an experience good whose distribution is asymmetric. Assigning a value to an experience good is troublesome before having consumed it.
A bottle of wine is a typical experience good. Information experience goods such as newspapers, far from being necessarily mellifluous, are characterized by novelty each time they are consumed (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) . Moreover, being asymmetrically distributed, it is not known when a piece of knowledge will be available in codified form (David, 2003) .
Another unique feature of information resources is that knowledge, defined as a mix of information and other facts and details more difficult to codify and readily transfer (Polanyi, 1966; Cowan et al., 2000) which constitute cognitive human capabilities, is cumulative and interactive in a way in which advances in state of the art build upon previous findings in unpredictable manners.
The foregoing features render public goods in general and information resources in particular, susceptible to free riding and predisposed to being underprovided.
Public subsidies to firms engaging in certain productions, direct public provision and regulated monopoly are classical solutions for the conventional public good problem.
Analogously, there are three main remedies for the problem of information appropriation.
Sometimes recalled as "the three P's" (David, 2000) , these are: Patronage that is awarding publicly funded grants based upon the submission of research proposals; procurement that is governmental provision or contracting for intellectual work and finally property. The last solution consists of the concession of exclusive property rights to new knowledge creators.
Regarding the legal institution meant to solve the problem of appropriation of digital expression of ideas through concession of exclusive rights, namely copyright, some vices emerge to counterbalance the main advantage, say the incentive to innovation. The deadweight of monopoly and the network inefficiencies regarding standardization and modular development are among the main defects. The deadweight of monopoly implies that an information good available for a price higher than its marginal cost cannot be afforded and hence consumed by everyone even though additional supply practically does not cost anything. Inefficiencies with respect to standardization and modularity concern especially software products and indicate that exclusive property rights may oblige agents to pursue alternative, non infringing innovation paths, with consequent proliferation of products and units characterized by incompatibility and technical inseparability.
Apart from these, there is the possibility to wickedly make the most of the appropriation institution and privatise public domain information resources.
This sort of predatory action is known as hijacking, implying taking control and possession of other's freely accessible works without leaving, in this case, any hope of deliverance.
When an information resource is collectively provided and placed in the public domain, hijacking sounds even more censurable and in theory resembles a real theft.
But what can be the actual economic and social downfalls, if any, of this strategy? After all, we live in a world where homo homini lupus est (Plautus, 254-186 B.C.; Hobbes, 1641) and predatory actions are part of the competitive game, nourishing the Smithsonian invisible hand. Some reasons why it is argued here that hijacking is undesirable, reside in what will be discussed later on in the paper.
In a way it is paradoxical that the goods most susceptible to being hijacked, say libre software and open content works, are the very ones fuelled by a set of diverse motivations (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2000; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Mateos Garcia and Steinmueller, 2003a ) that render free-riding less relevant or even desirable for their development (Gosh, 1998; Raymond, 1999; Weber, 2000) . In other words, in their case, the positive externality, generated by increasing the size of the network outweighs the value of exclusivity as a reason to avoid free-riding (Ciffolilli, 2003) . Although open source software endeavours can be definitely hijacked, there is no agreement on the fact that this necessarily constitutes a damaging circumstance. The diffused and rational worry is that the proprietary strategy to copyright a collective produced public good may "hold up" developers that lose the ability to customise a project to their needs (Lerner and Tirole, 2003) . However, some commentators and project participants disagree and stress that hijacking is not likely to happen often and, when it does, it bears desirable spillovers (Reese and Stemberg, 2001) . The latter claim is based on the belief that hijacking can only be avoided by using copyleft 3 , but the highly restrictive nature of this kind of license may also hinder the development prospects of a project. The rationale behind this claim goes as follows. 3 The characteristics of these licenses are discussed in paragraph 4.
While it is true that copyleft was originally designed by Richard Stallman 4 to prevent predatory and anti-cooperative behaviours leading to appropriation of public domain works, it is also a fact that commercial firms planning to exploit open source endeavours must face costs and barriers that make the actual encroachment difficult. In other words, it
is not guaranteed that the savings in development and maintenance costs associated with an in-house product as well as other benefits of hijacking will exceed its costs.
In the case of software for instance, the costs and difficulties arising from the search for a useful product, the validation of the found object, its integration, assessment and maintenance may indeed make hijacking a non-profitable option for private firms. On the basis of similar claims, some copyleft opponents argue that there is little evidence of commercial exploitation in the real world and when it happens, consequences can even be positive for virtual communities (Reese and Stenberg, op. cit.) Indeed, when endeavours aiming to contribute to public domain knowledge assemblages are appropriated, outcomes may be spoiled, with possible negative consequences on the spontaneous provision of a public good. The case of The Open Directory Project aims to illustrate this idea. DMOZ was founded in the spirit of the open source/free software movement and is totally free. There is no cost either to submit a site to the directory or to use its data.
Hijacking in Cyberspace: The Case of the Open Directory Project
The ultimate vision of DMOZ is to build a definitive catalogue of the Web, therefore providing the means for the Internet to organize itself. At the roots of this ambition is the possibility to exploit Linux's Law economies that can be interpreted here as: The more people there are editing the directory, the greater its comprehensiveness becomes and the higher its value in discriminating between the useless and the best web content.
Anybody can sign up and contribute to DMOZ by choosing a category of interest and applying. The project is also characterized by a system of distributed authority (Mateos Garcia and Steinmueller, 2003a) since after editors have gained experience with a specialized subject, they can move up in the hierarchy and edit more general categories.
The copyright of the catalogue is owned by Netscape Communications Corporation. The directory is made available to the public under the terms of the Open Directory License, a non-exclusive license that allows free use and download of DMOZ content as long as recognition is given to Netscape 8 .
The Open Directory Project was born mainly in response to the problem of long delays with which the well known directory Yahoo! processes applications and lists websites. Its current dimension and relative success notwithstanding, DMOZ hardly joins the list of the most popular Internet search sites (see Figure 1 ). This might be due in part to technical troubles 9 thought to plague the directory (Olsen and Hu, 2003) , in part to the fact that DMOZ did not actually manage to solve the delay problems affecting commercial players.
6 A directory is a web catalogue resembling the table of contents of a book. It is characterized by a specific structure and edited by individuals (e.g. surfers). Differently, a search engine does not have a contents outline and is not human edited but uses an automatic programme to crawl cyberspace in search for keywords or keyword lists defined by webmasters. Google and AOL (which owns Netscape) are usual "shoppers" and even Yahoo! uses DMOZ data to enhance its relevant search results
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. All this would not be a big deal, if the search engines market was not going through quick and important changes which are going to be discussed in what follows.
In general, web directories are dropping behind search engines. The latter automatically crawls the Internet and records the sites found on the basis of a certain search algorithm that, at first glance, seems to guarantee better results, either in terms of the reach or the quality of the searched information.
The number of search engines has reduced substantially over the last few years, probably to an extent as a consequence of the New Economy crisis that opened the millennium. In general, there is less advertising money keeping them afloat (Vaughan, 2003 (Sullivan, 2003) . Some others, such as AltaVista, have been acquired and even if they did not disappear completely, they eventually lost their appeal or, better still, their market share. Where are our American Indian friends then? Is it possible that nobody would be interested in their history? Actually, we must wait for the third page of results to obtain some information we have been looking for, as well as some war news concerning the deadly helicopter called, alas, Apache. The point is that pages dealing with the Apache web-server gather a high concentration of links, simply because the majority of very active Internet users, as well as bloggers, are more interested in the web-server than the American Indian tribe. There might be a great deal of pages dealing with tribes, and swarms of interested surfers seeking them, but none of those pages would ever generate the same amount of hypertext links that only one major Apache web-server portal is able to gather.
Even if the existence of these flaws is unquestionable, at the same time it cannot be denied that a wise use of search techniques makes it possible overcoming most biases. The case of apache is deliberately an exaggeration since it is enough to use the keyword "tribe" in conjunction with apache, for example, in order to retrieve relevant outcomes.
13 Some of these tricks are described in Vaughan (op. cit.) . For instance, the possibility of embedding the word Republican either in the HTLM code, using the background colour, or in the keyword list of a Democratic website resembles a particularly funny case of diverting searchers towards a specific and hated destination. 14 See: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=apache (last accessed 13 April 2004).
A possibly related but much more relevant problem is that free and paid rankings started to be mixed together without the user's awareness and this appears to be likely to become the trend after the latest developments in the market.
In Before these recent developments, both Google and Yahoo! had already begun selling "real estate" to online stores, a strategy already pursued in the past by Lycos and Infoseek.
Yahoo! started in 1999 to require fees from websites in order to retain their listings. Later, Google inaugurated its sponsored links. Negative consequences for information reliability are indisputable, especially for those who use search engines for education and research purposes. Now, the latest move of Yahoo! (i.e. the acquisition of Overture) outlines a new scenario, characterized by an extremely concentrated market and the contraposition of a few big actors competing in both free and paid searches. Figure 1 provides There is a risk that the distance between paid and relevance driven searches is going to fade and the impression is that, in general, the non-commercial roots of directories are drying up and with them the opportunity to distinguish useful and worthless information.
The value of a knowledge assemblage characterized by complementary dependence is reduced by the subtraction of a piece of information. Even if this is not detrimental to the usability of the collection, the systematic incorporation of low quality contributions (e.g.
the mix between paid and free search) may render the assemblage useless, in the medium term. A copyleft, rather then a simple attribution licence might be, in this case, a wiser choice. It does not forbid commercial exploitation, but only shields the coherence of the collectively constructed public good and, for instance in the examined case, avoids the undesirable event in which the exploited genuine information is subtracted, once and for all, from the public domain and mixed together with pay-per-play catalogues.
The circumstance of DMOZ is similar to that of a river whose water is clean in the proximity of the source but then gets polluted along its way to the sea. Providing healthy mineral water to a thirsty market implies bottling nearby the source. Those who draw upon DMOZ database are otherwise delivering information "bottled" near the estuary, where a thriving industrialising town is located.
On one hand, the source may dry up that is, in the long term, contributors are discouraged from participating in the project. On the other hand, if those who control proprietary information assemblages embodying DMOZ data, predominate the search market and its distribution channels, DMOZ resources might eventually become accessible in the sole formats in which their blenders are willing to provide them (e.g. mixture of paid and relevance driven information).
In general, beyond the particular case of DMOZ, endeavours aiming to contribute to public domain knowledge can be appropriated, outcomes may be spoiled, with possible negative consequences on the spontaneous provision of a public good. The studied case allows extrapolating clearly what some of the risk of public digital domain exploitation might be.
Remedies are discussed in the next paragraphs.
The Promise of New IPR Institutions: Copyleft and "Customisation Agencies"
Copyleft is a novel license provision which, thanks to a creative and wise use of copyright law, seems able to permanently affect the development path of digital knowledge assemblages released under its terms
18
. Indeed, if a work is copylefted, everyone can copy, use and modify it, and then distribute the modified versions without asking the copyright holder for permission, as long as the derivative works are also released under the same license terms. Such characteristic, sometimes derogatively referred to as viral nature, assures that a work, a piece of knowledge, or an assemblage whose author/s decided to make it freely available, remains as such, and the same is true for its possible improvements. These licenses represent a new paradigm for the design and interpretation of intellectual property rights. On the market of digital information goods, the new paradigm is competing with the traditional one: Copyright. Both aim to solve a certain set of legal and socio-economic issues, namely the appropriation of economic benefits and the promise of a certain life expectancy to collectively created digital goods.
Copyleft does not preclude commercial exploitation of a piece of work. Complementary services and improvements or modifications of the work itself can be sold but the copylefted content will never 19 be subtracted from the conservancy in which it was placed and raised.
All these mentioned features render this path-breaking legal innovation a restrictive 20 provision (Lerner and Tirole, 2003) , not completely free from downfalls (Ciffolilli, 2003b) .
In general, a high degree of restrictiveness 21 can be smoothed by pursuing further IPR customisation. This can be interpreted as either ad hoc design of license provisions or application of dynamic licensing (Bezroukov, 2002) . The former case resembles the strategy of Creative Commons, the latter implies designing licenses in a way that their terms change according to the life cycle of an information resource.
The next paragraph briefly describes the case of Creative Commons.
18 See for example: http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/copyleft.html (last accessed 12 April 2004). 19 If, of course, copyleft proves to be able to survive the test of a trial in court. 20 Restrictiveness is intended as the ability to prevent licensees of a copylefted software, for example, from distributing a proprietary modified version of the product without releasing the source code. 21 A high degree of restrictiveness can be intended as the condition, characterising the GNU General Public License, which prevents open source licensees from mingling copylefted source code with non-copylefted code.
The Creative Commons Approach: Tailoring a Suitable License
The interesting approach of Creative Commons towards licensing proves how the use of restrictive provisions can be made flexible and hence solves the seeming oxymoron of "flexible copyright". This is meant to show that, even if the trade-off between pros and cons of a restrictive licence probably cannot be solved once and for all, the friction among positive and negative effects can definitely be smoothed with an innovative approach to licensing that makes flexibility and customisation its main virtues.
The vision
Creative Commons ( . Although, that would have been a stroke of luck with respect to some of them, the problem is definitely relevant.
CC supporters believe that without the legal provision of "copyright by default", many authors would have been willing to choose a different degree of protection for their works.
In other words, CC declared itself spokesman of all those people that would either like to CC's main goal is to provide an easy mechanism that allows authors to customize copyright law creatively according to their desires of flexibility. The project's vision makes direct reference to the legal concepts of the public domain, the idea of the commons, the open content and the intellectual property conservancies.
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The Public Domain is defined as the body of intellectual endeavours unfettered by law.
Innovation and creativity rely on this heritage that turns out to be particularly important in the digital age of collaborative creative activities when, it is notwithstanding threatened and retrenched by the expansion of intellectual property protection. This expansion contributes to the implementation of a commodity transaction model of information creation and distribution which endorses the interests of a certain category of economic agents or a certain constituency, whilst utterly disregards others (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000) .
If the Public Domain can be considered a container, the Commons represent its content of inexhaustible resources, in the case of ideas for example, jointly held and accessible without permission. Open content is the philosophy according to which CC intends to develop its menu of licenses, namely a set of legal provisions that allow anyone to use certain works without any specific permission or royalty payment. The final goal of CC is the manufacture of an intellectual property conservancy, where works of particular public importance are prevented from becoming exclusive ownership and protected from obsolescence.
The licenses' menu
In December 2002, Creative Commons started its activity with the release of a set of copyright licenses free for public use.
Although CC conductors got inspired openly by the GNU GPL, the organization does not deal with software, but designs licenses for other kinds of creative works such as websites, Figure 2 summarizes the basic features that can be combined, matched and mixed together to obtain a customized ad hoc provision.
28 Currently CC provides a total of eleven licenses to choose from. In addition, it provides bespoke Commons Deed and metadata that can be added to GNU GPL, GNU LGPL, public domain dedications, sampling licenses and founder's copyright (a license granting exclusive rights for a shorter period than usual copyright Besides, CC promotes a web-log for general discussion and a "discuss page" in which several groups of people, each coordinated by a Project Lead, engage in a more in-depth research on an issue meant to deserve investigation. The purpose of each discussion group is to produce a workable proposal to be implemented by CC, when needed.
As said, all these innovative features characterizing the activity of CC allow designing, case by case, ad hoc licenses that may retain their copyleft strength against hijacking and, at the same time, may soften the side effects of a GPL-style restrictive provision.
Since willingness to be flexible when using copyright must take into account legal system precepts and the international trends towards IPR extension, the case of CC represents a great learning exercise for new knowledge creators as well as policy makers.
Conclusion
Hijacking and subsequent copyrighting of digital information add onto the list of flaws characterizing the concession of exclusive property rights to new knowledge creators. The possible side effects of hijacking are particularly sinister in the case of collectively produced open content works such as, for example, the Open Directory Project which is, in fact, a pure public good.
The main goal of DMOZ, that is building a comprehensive catalogue of the web which would help in overcoming its congestion costs, seems at risk. Systematic hijacking of DMOZ data by commercial search engines and directories, as well as their inclusion in digital arrangements that tend to mix paid ranks and relevance driven information results, contributes to privatisation and depletion of public domain knowledge.
Far from arguing that the institution of copyright is obsolete, this essay suggests that IPR can be customised and adapted to circumstances in which hijacking is likely to reveal itself as disruptive as in the analysed case.
On one hand, the principle of copyleft constitutes a powerful tool available for digital content creators and policy makers, implying that information arrangements built upon freely accessible resources should be distributed under licensing terms similar to those covering those original resources. On the other hand, in the cases in which copyleft appears so restrictive that participation in a collective project may be discouraged, further customisation is always a feasible strategy. The case of Creative Commons illustrates this point and represents a critical learning exercise.
